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Recognizing when the world changes is fundamental for normal learning. In this issue of Neuron, Bradfield
et al. (2013) show that cholinergic interneurons in dorsomedial striatum are critical to the process whereby
new states of the world are appropriately registered and retrieved during associative learning.Recognizing when the world has
changed—and when it has not—is a
fundamental yet much ignored compo-
nent of associative learning. Imagine relo-
cating to Sydney, Australia. While much
there might be familiar, one prominent
difference is of life-or-death import: the
cars come from the right. If you don’t learn
to look right-left-right before crossing,
your visitmightbequite short.On theother
hand, since you plan to venture to proper-
side-of-the-road-driving countries period-
ically, it would behoove you to also main-
tain your previous left-right-left behavior,
applying thatwhenappropriate.Optimally,
rather than overwriting your original strat-
egy for crossing the street, upon experi-
encing the strange driving habits in your
new hometown, you would form a new
‘‘state’’ of ‘‘I am in Sydney’’ and learn
new mappings from actions to goals
(‘‘policies’’ in the jargon of reinforcement
learning, ‘‘action-outcome associations’’in terms of learning theory) relevant to
that state. Linking these learned policies
to the new state would, conveniently, pro-
tect the old policies linked to the old state
from being overwritten, so that behavior
could be modified quickly if the old state
were to reappear.
As this example illustrates, appropriate
recognition of when to form new states to
which to attach information is vital to
adaptive behavior. In this issue of Neuron,
Bradfield and colleagues (Bradfield et al.,
2013) use a series of complex yet highly
controlled behavioral manipulations to
show that input fromapart of the thalamus,
the parafascicular nucleus, onto cholin-
ergic interneurons in the posterior com-
partment of the dorsomedial striatum
(pDMS), is critical to the appropriate crea-
tion of new states during learning. Note
that we use ‘‘state’’ here to refer to a high-
order representation of the environment in
which actions are being chosen—a notionthat encompasses the animal learning
theory terms of ‘‘context,’’ ‘‘discriminative
stimulus,’’ and ‘‘occasion setter’’ as well
as the statistical learning theory term
‘‘latent cause’’ (Gershman and Niv, 2010),
but is different from common usage of the
term in reinforcement learning.
In the first phase of training, Bradfield
et al. (2013) taught rats to associate two
levers with two different, but equally
valued, rewards (pellets or sucrose). Sati-
ating the rats on one of the two outcomes
(a so-called ‘‘devaluation test’’) selec-
tively reduced responding on the lever
leading to that outcome and not on the
lever leading to the other outcome.
Notably, this was the case both for intact
rats and for rats in which cholinergic
signaling in the pDMS, an area previously
shown to be necessary for goal-directed
behavior (Yin et al., 2005), was disrup-
ted via several different manipulations
(Figure 1, left). This intact initial learning,ron 79, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 3
Figure 1. Illustration of Bradfield et al.’s Experimental Design, Results, and Interpretation
Reward for the two actions were a food pellet or sucrose solution (top). All tests were conducted without reward, retraining was administered after tests as neces-
sary, d denotes no action, and all conditions were counterbalanced (see Bradfield et al., 2013). Selective test responding only on the lever that had previously
been mapped to the nondevalued/nondegraded/reinstated outcome in the control group suggests that each change in task contingencies was encoded by the
rats as a new state (middle). In contrast, disruption of cholinergic activity in pDMS resulted in nonspecific degradation, devaluation, and reinstatement of both
actions, but only after initial learning (bottom). This could be ascribed to (A) a retrieval deficit that causedmultiple states to be retrieved throughout or (B) a deficit in
creating new states when the identity but not the value of outcomes was changed, such that training in challenges I and II was combined with the initial training.
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strated that behavior was indeed goal
directed (i.e., guided by an expectation
of the specific outcome and its unique
attributes [Dickinson and Balleine, 1994])
and that intact cholinergic activity in the
pDMS is not necessary for this funda-
mental learning process.
Butwhat happens if theworld changes?
This was tested in a second phase of
training, in which rats faced three chal-
lenges (Figure 1, top), each designed to
test how changes in the associative struc-
ture of the environment would be incorpo-
rated into the earlier learning. The first
involved contingency degradation—the
outcome associated with one of the levers
was presented for free, meaning that rats
no longer needed to work to receive that
reward. The second, reversal learning,
involved switching the outcomes associ-
ated with each lever, followed by another
devaluation test of the effects of satiety
on responding. The third, extinction,4 Neuron 79, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Ininvolved removal of all outcomes for
actions, followed by a ‘‘reinstatement
test’’ in which one of the outcomes was
delivered to test whether it could reinstate
pressing on the lever most recently
associated with that outcome. In each
challenge, the critical question was
whether rats would appropriately create
new states in which to represent the new
environmental contingencies. If so, each
challenge should selectively affect re-
sponding on the lever most recently
associated with the degraded, devalued
or reinstated outcome. Any nonspecific
effects on both levers would suggest that
something had gone awry.
The results were amazingly clear-cut: in
each case, intact rats exhibited selective
effects on subsequent testing (Figure 1,
middle), whereas rats in which cholinergic
signaling in the pDMS had been dis-
rupted showed intermediate or nonspe-
cific effects on testing (Figure 1, bottom).
Importantly, this same behavioral patternc.was induced by bilateral lesions of the
parafascicular nucleus, crossed lesions
of the parafascicular nucleus and the
pDMS, or a pharmacological manipula-
tion that disrupted cholinergic signaling
in the pDMS only during the learning
phases. This exhaustive characterization
of the phenomenon shows both that it is
reliable and that it depends on cholinergic
signaling at the time of learning, with the
latter explicitly confirmed using an immu-
nohistochemistry tool specific to cholin-
ergic interneurons that was recently
developed by the Balleine lab (Bertran-
Gonzalez et al., 2012). In addition, these
results were shown to be specific to
cholinergic disruption in the pDMS as
they was not reproduced by manipula-
tions of cholinergic function in the anterior
portion of the dorsomedial striatum.
What Does All This Mean?
While these results are extremely elegant
in their consistency and convergence,
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interpret theoretically. What exactly has
gone wrong with the state generation
process due to the cholinergic manipu-
lations? Here, the comprehensive set of
metaphoric hoops through which the
rats were made to jump becomes key to
narrowing down the options, highlighting
the utility of using the incisive behavioral
manipulations that animal learning theo-
rists have spent decades developing.
To understand what went wrong, it is
useful to first review what aspects of
learning were not disrupted by cholinergic
manipulations: in addition to intact goal-
directed learning, the comprehensive
battery of tests shows that new state
formation was not completely abolished.
This is evident in the test following the
third challenge, extinction training, in
which exposure to one of the outcomes
led to reinstatement of responding.
Reinstatement indicates that extinction
training did not simply overwrite and
erase previous associations between ac-
tions and outcomes (Gershman et al.,
2010), but rather reward omission caused
rats in both groups to create a new state
(Figure 1, state 4). However, reinstate-
ment in cholinergically impaired rats was
far from normal: these rats reinstated
both actions (Figure 1, right).
Retrieval Deficit
One possible explanation for this pattern
of results (option A in Figure 1, bottom)
is that upon reinstatement the rats errone-
ously retrieved two states—the most
recent, postreversal state (state 3 in
Figure 1), in which the right lever was
mapped to sucrose and the left to pellets,
and the state from initial training (state 1 in
Figure 1), in which the lever to reward
mapping was the reverse. This may, in
fact, sound familiar to world travelers: a
foolproof policy for safe street-crossing
in some countries is to look left-right-
left-right repeatedly, that is, to act upon
both pre-travel and in-travel states.
Such a retrieval deficit could also ex-
plain the lack of specificity of the post-
reversal devaluation test, in which cholin-
ergically impaired rats devalued both
actions rather than only the one associ-
ated with the satiated outcome (Figure 1,
third column). Finally, it can also explain
the intermediate level of responding in
thecontingencydegradation test (Figure1,second column) by assuming that the new
state (state 2, in which not pressing was
associated with the outcome) was re-
trieved togetherwith the old state (state 1).
The deficit in reinstatement was
observed even when cholinergic func-
tion was disrupted only during learning,
yet this does not rule out a retrieval
deficit, as retrieval of the appropriate
states is also necessary during learning.
That is, in order to learn, on every trial, the
rat must retrieve and update associations
within the current state. If multiple states
were retrieved and updated during
learning, the rat would show a non-selec-
tive response in the reinstatement test
even though normal cholinergic function
had been restored. Importantly, under
this interpretation, new state formation is
intact; however, retrieval of appropriate
states isdisruptedor at least less selective.
State Creation Deficit
A second possible explanation (option B
in Figure 1, bottom) is that the rats with
disrupted cholinergic function might
have been able to form a new state in
extinction but not in the other challenges.
Whywould this happen? To answer this, it
is useful to ask how the brain knows that a
new state should be formed in the first
place. One impetus for state creation is
significant differences between the cur-
rent situation and past experience (Gersh-
man et al., 2010). According to this idea,
prediction errors—differences between
what is expected (driving is on the right
of the road, mass transportation is called
‘‘subway,’’ etc.) and what is currently
experienced (cars are on the left, the un-
derground train is ‘‘the city circle’’)—drive
state formation. Importantly, these pre-
diction errors include both errors in pre-
dicted value (the city circle is not cheap),
and errors in predicted identity (would
you expect ‘‘the city circle’’ to indicate
an underground train system?). The
former are typically termed reward pre-
diction errors (though we use ‘‘value,’’ as
changes in rewarding events can also
induce identity prediction errors), and
Bradfield et al. (2013) refer to the latter
as ‘‘state prediction errors,’’ though we
prefer ‘‘identity,’’ as any sort of error could
lead to recognition of state change.
Bradfield et al.’s first two manipula-
tions—contingency degradation and
reversal learning—involved only identityNeuprediction errors, since the underlying
value of the reward associated with lever
pressing did not change. However, the
last manipulation introduced value pre-
diction errors since the reward was
entirely omitted. If cholinergic transmis-
sion in the striatum is important for detect-
ing, representing, or learning from identity
prediction errors, one would expect to
see no new state formation in the first
two manipulations due to the cholinergic
manipulation, but intact state formation
during extinction learning. Thus, like a
retrieval deficit, a selective effect on the
formation of new states following iden-
tity prediction errors would also produce
the observed pattern of results (Figure 1,
bottom).
What’s Ach Got to Do with It?
Though relatively little is known about the
function of cholinergic striatal interneu-
rons, what we know so far relates nicely
to these two interpretations. For example,
one can easily imagine a key role for
striatal acetylcholine (Ach) in retrieval:
cholinergic interneurons are inhibitory,
tonically active, and innervate (and
receive input from) a large number of me-
dium spiny neurons (Zhou et al., 2002).
This places this local modulatory system
in a prime position to provide network-
wide inhibition, promoting retrieval of
only the relevant state at each point in
time (Apicella, 2007). By reducing cholin-
ergic tone, Bradfield et al. (2013) could
have thus caused rats to retrieve multiple
states during decision making and
learning, thereby supporting the first inter-
pretation above. On the other hand,
cholinergic interneurons also respond to
important events with phasic changes in
firing that are notably unrelated to value
prediction errors (Morris et al., 2004). Do
these responses relate instead to identity
prediction errors? This has yet to be
tested, and would support the second
interpretation.
However, even without complete un-
derstanding of the striatal circuitry and
its reliance on acetylcholine, the powerful
toolkit provided by traditional animal
learning theory could be used to test and
differentiate the above two hypotheses.
One key experiment would be to train
rats to associate the two levers with
reward of decidedly different magnitude
and then put them through Bradfieldron 79, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 5
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depended on the need to learn from iden-
tity prediction errors, behavior should now
be impervious to cholinergic interventions
in the pDMS, since all three manipulations
would involve value as well as identity
prediction errors. If, on the other hand,
the problem was one of retrieval, then
the rats’ responding should still reflect
the erroneous association of both levers
with both outcomes, with response rates
postreversal evidencing similar predic-
tions for both levers. Of course, single
unit recordings would still be useful for
understanding the relationship between
either of these roles and the precise
firing patterns of the neurons, as well as
the dynamics of learning in the striatal6 Neuron 79, July 10, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Innetwork that gives rise to these func-
tions (and associated deficits). How-
ever, it is always inspiring to see well-
controlled behavioral designs reveal
underlying neural processes, even absent
electrodes.
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Hohl et al. (2013) found that fluctuations in neuronal responses in the middle temporal area (MT) are corre-
lated with variability in smooth pursuit eye movements. The pattern of neuron-behavior correlations con-
strainsmodels of how sensory neurons guide behavior and establishes pursuit as an attractivemodel system
for studying how sensory neurons guide behavior.The way humans and animals respond to
any sensory stimulus is unreliable. For
example, an animal being pursued by a
predator might sometimes run away and
might other times lie still and hide. Some
of this behavioral variability might come
from variability in the way sensory stimuli
are encoded in the brain. Neuronal
responses are also variable: a given
neuron in visual cortex, for example, will
respond differently each time an animal
views the same visual stimulus.
Over the past two decades, experi-
menters have capitalized on this vari-
ability to establish a link between the
activity of neurons in different brain areas
and specific behaviors. The earliest such
study measured the relationship between
motion-direction-selective neurons in the
middle temporal area (MT) and monkeys’decisions in a motion-direction discrimi-
nation task that required the animals to
determine in which of two opposite direc-
tions a random dot stimulus was moving
(Britten et al., 1996). On repeated presen-
tations of an identical stimulus, fluctua-
tions in the activity of single MT neurons
were weakly but consistently correlated
with the monkeys’ decisions. On trials in
which a neuron tuned for upward motion
fired more than its average, the monkey
was more likely to report seeing upward
than downward motion.
Since that initial study, correlations be-
tween the fluctuations in the responses of
individual neurons and behavior (typically
called choice probability for discrimina-
tion tasks or detect probability for detec-
tion tasks) have been observed in a vari-
ety of sensory areas and behavioraltasks (for review, see Nienborg et al.,
2012; Parker and Newsome, 1998). The
existence of such neuron-behavior corre-
lations, when combined with data from
more causal experimental methods like
pharmacology, lesions, or electrical stim-
ulation, can provide evidence that those
neurons are part of the neural mecha-
nisms underlying specific percepts or be-
haviors (Parker and Newsome, 1998).
Using neuron-behavior correlations (or
other experimental methods) to infer the
computation that downstream areas
perform to decode sensory information
from areas like MT has been much more
difficult, however. This difficulty has at
least three sources. (1) The relationship
between any one neuron’s activity and
behavior is typically weak and noisy. This
is expected because a large number of
